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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                        
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal by defendant/third party plaintiff Commer-
cial Union Insurance Company ("CU") arises out of a suit brought 
by plaintiff/appellee NL Industries ("NL") seeking a declaration 
that it is entitled to product liability insurance coverage for a 
large number of lawsuits alleging lead paint exposure.  Jurisdic-
tion is based on diversity of citizenship.  CU appeals from the 
grant of summary judgment against it in order to contest: (1) the 
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district court's choice of New Jersey law and its apparently 
consequent summary judgment requiring CU to fund NL's defense in 
the underlying tort actions; (2) the court's refusal to apportion 
the defense costs incurred in the underlying litigation between 
covered and non-covered claims; and (3) its denial of CU's claim 
for contribution against third party defendants/appellees 
Insurance Company of North America ("INA"), Northbrook Insurance 
Company, and certain underwriters at Lloyd's of London, (the 
"London Insurers").   
 We hold that the district court erred in applying New 
Jersey substantive law.  Under New Jersey choice of law rules, 
which are applicable since the case was litigated in the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941), 
the law of the place of contracting applies unless some other 
state has a "dominant significant relationship" to the 
transaction.  The policy was negotiated and signed in New York, 
and thus the parties reasonably expected, as the district court 
recognized, that New York law would govern the interpretation of 
the contract. Moreover, at all relevant times, the parties each 
had their principal places of business in New York, the premiums 
were paid in New York, and New York taxes were paid on the 
policies.   
 In contrast, it is patent that New Jersey has none of 
the contacts with or interests in the litigation that could give 
rise to the requisite relationship.  Significantly, none of the 
underlying tort claims involved New Jersey plaintiffs.  Because 
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the lead paint coverage actions had been joined with certain 
environmental coverage actions (seeking coverage for claims that 
NL was responsible for environmental harms at sites in New Jersey 
and elsewhere), the district court relied upon Gilbert Spruance 
Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 
1993), as a basis for applying New Jersey law.  But since that 
case has no application to tort-related cases, we conclude that 
the court was incorrect in applying it here.  And while it is 
arguable that the states where the lead paint claims arose had a 
relationship to the transaction, we do not believe that they have 
the "dominant and significant relationship" necessary to displace 
the law of New York, which is the law of the place of contract-
ing, of performance, and of the tort. 
 Because the district court's application of New Jersey 
instead of New York law to the coverage issues was legally 
erroneous, we must reverse the grant of summary judgment.  In 
view of this result, we do not reach the substantive questions of 
CU's duty to defend, its right to allocation, or the availability 
of a contribution claim against INA, for on remand these must be 
reconsidered pursuant to New York law.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 This is one of two separate declaratory judgment 
actions brought by NL, a New Jersey corporation with its 
principal place of business in New York, against CU for insurance 
coverage under contracts negotiated and performed in New York.  
NL first sought a declaration that CU was obligated to defend it 
in product liability lawsuits in Massachusetts, New York, and 
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Louisiana arising out of NL's manufacture of lead paint pigment.  
NL later added claims for coverage for four additional lead paint 
suits.  The various plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits alleged 
personal injuries as the result of lead paint exposure.  NL did 
not, however, seek a declaration of CU's obligation to indemnify 
it with respect to the first three lead paint actions in this 
lawsuit; instead, NL included that issue in a separate lawsuit, 
the so-called "environmental action."  See NL Industries, Inc. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 90-2125 (D.N.J.).  In that action, 
NL also seeks a declaration that CU is obligated to defend and 
indemnify NL in connection with approximately 385 environmental 
claims arising from numerous sites throughout the United States. 
 The lead paint cases underlying this coverage suit 
arise from the use of lead paint or paint containing lead pigment 
manufactured by NL.  The underlying complaints allege that NL 
knew since the early 1900's of the dangers posed by lead paints, 
and charge that NL "affirmatively misrepresented the safety, 
suitability and qualities of lead paint through [its] 
advertisements and promotional activities." (JA 21 at 1890-92; 
1824-26; 1737-38; 1702-04.)  They contain allegations of negli-
gence, fraud, civil conspiracy, and other intentional torts.   
The plaintiffs also allege that NL organized the Lead Industries 
Association ("the LIA") to respond to the negative information 
being revealed about lead paint, and that NL's high-level 
executives played an active role in the LIA, which led an effort 
to discredit adverse medical evidence about the hazards of lead 
paint in order to ward off any additional government regulation.  
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Documentary evidence submitted by CU supports these allegations 
of fraud and other intentional torts.  Many of the meetings 
organizing these activities allegedly occurred in New York.   
 The district court found that New York was the place of 
contracting for all of the policies issued to NL by CU.  NL had 
used a New York-based insurance broker to negotiate these con-
tracts.  The contracts were countersigned in CU's New York 
office. During the time that the relevant CU policies were in 
effect, NL maintained its national headquarters and principal 
place of business in New York.  Both NL and CU's original 
objectively reasonable expectations were that New York law would 
control any disputes involving these contracts. See 7/11/91 Op. 
at 10.0  CU coded these policies as New York contracts, and 
premium taxes on the policies were paid in New York. 
 The CU policies at issue were effective from February 
1, 1966 to January 1, 1978.  Some policies covered the period 
from February 1, 1966 to February 1, 1970 and provided coverage 
for bodily injury only.  Other policies were effective from 
February 1, 1970 to January 1, 1978 and covered both bodily 
injury and property damage claims.  The insuring agreements 
typically state: 
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of  
   Coverage A bodily injury or 
   Coverage B property damage 
                                                           
0In adopting the district court's finding about the parties' 
expectations, we do not consider the affidavits submitted by CU 
in the litigation of these four new suits, for the district court 
properly noted that "[t]he time for the presentation of such 
evidence has long passed."  5/26/94 Op. at 11. 
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to which this insurance applies, caused by an 
occurrence, and the company shall have the right and 
duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking 
damages on account of such bodily injury or property 
damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent. . . . 
  
The policies typically define "occurrence" as follows:   
 
an accident, including injurious exposure to 
conditions, which results, during the policy period, in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the Insured. 
  
The policies provided by INA similarly specify that INA has the 
right and duty to defend bodily injury or property damage suits 
caused by an "occurrence," defined as an event that was "neither 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured."   
 In both cases involving the CU coverage, the 
allegations of intentional conduct would appear to put coverage 
at issue.  In contrast, the London policies in effect from 
November 19, 1949 to May 1, 1970 provide for (even broader) 
coverage of property damage in the following terms: 
COVERAGE. From and against all loss, costs, damages, 
attorney fees and expenses of whatever kind and nature 
which the Assured may sustain or incur by reason of or 
in consequence of: 
 
(a) Any and all liability imposed by law against the 
Assured for damage to or destruction of property 
of others . . . sustained or alleged to have been 
sustained, arising from any cause whatsoever . . . 
. 
 
 Despite the fact that NL was also covered by other 
primary insurers during the relevant period, NL named only CU as 
a defendant in this action.  Accordingly, CU filed a third-party 
complaint against those others -- the London Insurers, INA, and 
8 
Northbrook Insurance Company -- seeking a declaration that any 
obligation owed NL with respect to the underlying actions was 
subject to and limited by the obligations of the third-party 
defendants. 
 NL moved for partial summary judgment against CU 
seeking a declaration that New Jersey law would govern the 
interpretation of its contracts with CU and that CU was obligated 
to fund NL's defense in the three original lead paint actions.  
In a July 11, 1991 opinion, the district court purported to 
address the choice of law issue for both the lead paint and 
environmental coverage actions.  (The environmental coverage 
dispute, NL Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 
90-2125, was also pending in the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey.)  The court apparently was under the impression 
that it had to interpret a given insurance policy uniformly as to 
both the environmental and the lead paint coverage claims.  The 
court decided that New Jersey law was applicable and, applying 
it, granted NL's motion for defense costs of the three original 
lead paint claims. 
 The case was then referred to a magistrate judge for a 
hearing on the amount of defense costs.  On March 20, 1992, CU 
and NL entered into a stipulation and settlement agreement with 
respect to the payment of NL's defense costs incurred prior to 
March 1, 1992, in the three original lead paint actions.  The 
settlement agreement was intended by the parties to be a final, 
binding resolution of that issue.  Coverage for these three 
actions, dealt with in the settlement agreement, is therefore not 
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at issue here. After the settlement agreement was finalized, NL 
moved to amend its complaint to add the four new lead paint 
lawsuits, which form the basis for this appeal.   
 These new lead paint actions arose in Pennsylvania and 
Louisiana after the settlement of the coverage issues for the 
original three lead paint actions.0  NL then moved for summary 
judgment against CU alleging a duty to defend with respect to the 
four new actions.  CU followed with a motion for summary judgment 
against INA and the London Insurers on its claim for contribution 
for a portion of the more than $4 million CU paid to NL to 
reimburse NL's defense costs in the three original actions.  CU 
also sought allocation of defense costs among CU, INA, the London 
Insurers, and NL. 
 In opinions and orders dated August 6, 1993 and 
September 9, 1993, the magistrate judge granted NL summary 
judgment on the duty to defend the four new claims and denied 
CU's motion for contribution and allocation.0  CU filed a motion 
to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 59(e), which 
the Magistrate recommended be granted, deeming his opinions to be 
                                                           
0The additional suits were:  City of Philadelphia v. Lead 
Industries Ass'n, No. 90-7064 (E.D. Pa.); Hurt v. Philadelphia 
Housing Authority, No. 91-4746 (E.D. Pa.); Swartzbauer v. Lead 
Industries Ass'n, No. 91-CV-3948 (E.D. Pa.); Orleans Parish 
School Board v. Apex Sales Co., No. 91-6014 (La. Dist. Ct.). 
0The parties had originally consented to the jurisdiction of the 
magistrate judge to determine damages and all further proceedings 
after the district court's 7/11/91 opinion.  After the magistrate 
judge entered final judgment on the four new claims on November 
15, 1993, CU contested the magistrate's jurisdiction, leading to 
its Rule 59(e) motion. 
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reports and recommendations to the district court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §636(b). 
 On May 26, 1994, the district court filed an opinion 
adopting the magistrate judge's findings, granting summary 
judgment in favor of NL on the issue of CU's duty to defend the 
four new actions, and denying CU's motion for contribution and/or 
allocation.  The district court adhered to its previous determi-
nation that New Jersey law governed the interpretation of the 
contracts, relying in part on the law of the case doctrine (based 
on its disposition in the 7/11/91 opinion) and on concerns that 
applying different states' laws to the various claims would be 
unmanageable. The court denied CU's motion for contribution from 
INA and the London Insurers on the basis that it was premature.  
The court also declined to allocate defense costs between 
negligence and intentional tort claims on the grounds that there 
was no "substantial issue" as to coverage, and, consequently, 
that all claims were potentially covered.  This appeal followed. 
 Since choice of law analysis involves a purely legal 
question, we exercise plenary review.  Armotek Industries, Inc. 
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 760 n.5, 762 n. 8 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  Moreover, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment is also subject to plenary review.  Public Interest 
Research of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 
71 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991). 
II.  New Jersey Choice of Law Principles 
 A.  General Considerations 
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 At the outset, we must carefully distinguish between 
the environmental coverage disputes, which are not at issue in 
this appeal, and the (new) lead paint coverage actions, which 
are.  We must also keep conceptually separate the underlying 
merits actions (certainly not at issue here) from their 
corresponding coverage litigation.  This distinction is not only 
important for limiting our decision to what is properly at issue 
in this appeal; it also reflects a crucial distinction in New 
Jersey's choice of law jurisprudence. 
 In many areas of the law, New Jersey "has eschewed 
slavish devotion to rigid principles."  See Diamond Shamrock 
Chems. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 465 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 634 A.2d 528 (1993); Bell v. 
Merchants & Businessmen's Mut. Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 878, 880 (N.J. 
App. Div.), certif. denied, 585 A.2d 395 (1990); State v. Curry, 
532 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1987); Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187 (N.J. 
1986).  Choice of law is no exception.  Although the law of the 
place of contracting has historically governed the choice of law 
in insurance contract interpretation cases, see, e.g., Buzzone v. 
Hartford Ac. and Indem. Co., 129 A.2d 561 (1957), in keeping with 
the general trend the New Jersey courts have moved away from the 
mechanical application of this rule in favor of a more flexible 
approach focused on determining which state has the most 
meaningful connections with and interests in the transaction and 
the parties. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Simmons' 
Estate, 417 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1980); Gilbert Spruance Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885, 888 (N.J. 1993) 
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(reaffirming and applying Simmons); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. 
Gibson, 552 A.2d 644, 646-47 (N.J. App. Div. 1989) (applying the 
law of the place of contract unless the Restatement Conflict of 
Laws (Second) § 6 factors "compel a contrary result"). 
 Nonetheless, the factors that formerly controlled the 
choice of law analysis remain important considerations in the 
modern, more flexible approach embraced by the New Jersey courts. 
Thus, under New Jersey choice of law rules, the law of the place 
of contracting should ordinarily be applied unless some other 
state has the "dominant relationship" with the parties and 
issues. 
[T]he law of the place of the contract will govern the 
determination of the rights and liabilities of the 
parties under the insurance policy.  This rule is to be 
applied unless the dominant and significant 
relationship of another state to the parties and the 
underlying issue dictates that this basic rule should 
yield. 
 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 
488, 493 (N.J. 1980).  The presumption in favor of the place of 
contracting serves two objectives: (1) protecting the "reasonable 
expectations of the parties as to their insured risks," and (2) 
advancing "certainty, predictability and uniformity." Id. at 496; 
see also Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d at 888 (reaffirming general 
approach and motivating policies); Gibson, 552 A.2d at 646-47.0 
                                                           
0For these purposes, the place of contracting is the place where 
the parties executed and delivered the insurance policy. See, 
e.g., Nelson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 264 F. Supp. 501, 
503 (D.N.J. 1967); Empire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Melburg, 336 A.2d 483, 
484 (N.J. 1975); Melick v. Stanley, 416 A.2d 415, 417 (N.J. App. 
Div. 1980).  If a company from another state uses an insurance 
broker to negotiate and purchase its insurance policies, then the 
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 Factors and contacts set forth in the Restatement 
Conflict of Laws (Second) §§ 6 and 188 determine whether or not 
the place of contracting should in fact govern.  See Gilbert 
Spruance, 629 A.2d at 888; Simmons, 417 A.2d at 491-92.  The 
Restatement lists the following factors and contacts for a court 
to consider in determining whether the law of a state other than 
that of contracting has the requisite "dominant relationship." 
(a) the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested 
states and the relative interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular 
issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the 
particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity 
of result, and  
(g) ease in the determination and application 
of the law to be applied. 
  
Restatement Conflict of Laws (Second) § 6(2) (1988). 
 For contract actions in particular, § 188 of the 
Restatement contains the general rule that the law of the state 
with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the 
parties should apply.  See Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d at 888; 
Simmons, 417 A.2d at 491-92.  Section 188 also provides an 
enumeration of contacts -- such as the domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties, and the places of contracting and performance -- to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
place of contracting is the place where the broker negotiated the 
policies.  See Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 609 A.2d at 465. 
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guide the identification of the state with the most significant 
relationship.  Id. 
 One additional Restatement section is implicated here -
-§ 193 of the Restatement.  That section explains that, in the 
context of casualty insurance contracts, the application of the 
contacts articulated in § 188 and the concerns of § 6 should 
focus on determining which state "the parties understood . . . to 
be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of 
the policy unless with respect to the particular issue, some 
other state has a more significant relationship . . . to the 
transaction and the parties. . . ."   Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d 
at 889 (citation omitted, final ellipsis in original).  This 
focus on the parties' understanding of the principal location of 
the risk serves to protect both the parties' expectations as to 
which law would apply and the interests of the state where the 
risk is principally located in determining the extent of coverage 
under the insurance contract.  See Restatement of Conflicts 
(Second) § 193 cmt. c; Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d at 889. 
 
 B. Environmental Coverage Cases and the 
Inappositeness   of Gilbert Spruance to Product 
Liability Cases 
 
 Until fairly recently, New Jersey choice of law princi-
ples did not treat environmental coverage actions differently 
from other insurance coverage disputes.  Courts applied the 
analysis described above in environmental coverage cases as well 
as other insurance disputes to select a single state's law to 
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apply to all the related claims, irrespective of where the claims 
arose.   As the appellate division explained: 
[W]hen comprehensive nationwide coverage is purchased, 
it is surely the expectation of both insured and 
insurer that what the insured has bought and insurer 
has sold is a single protection from liability 
irrespective of the particular state law under which 
that liability is determined . . . . [T]he notion that  
the insured's rights under a single policy vary from 
state to state depending on the state in which the 
claim invoking the coverage arose contradicts not only 
the reasonable expectation of the parties but also the 
common understanding of the commercial community.  
 
See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
559 A.2d 435, 442 (N.J. App. Div. 1989). 
 In Westinghouse, the plaintiff insured had sought 
coverage from 144 insurers for thousands of toxic tort claims and 
numerous site-remediation (environmental) claims arising from 
eighty-one sites in twenty-three states.  Id. at 436.  The trial 
court severed and dismissed all claims for coverage arising 
outside of New Jersey on forum non conveniens grounds.  The 
Appellate Division reversed, explaining that the plaintiff was 
"entitled to a single, consistent and final resolution of the 
choice of law question in a single comprehensive action which 
will bind it and all its insurers." Id. at 442.  Although it 
specifically declined to reach the choice of law issue, the 
Westinghouse court reasoned that the combined adjudication of 
these multitudinous claims would be "manageable if the law of 
only one state is required to be restated."  Id. at 443. 
 Concerned by the possibility that resolution of 
coverage issues under one state's laws might deny coverage to 
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claims involving sites in another state whose laws applied to the 
underlying action -- thus frustrating the vindication of the site 
state's environmental policies by rendering many of the judgments 
uncollectible -- the New Jersey Supreme Court developed a 
specialized analysis for environmental coverage actions.  
Although Simmons, 417 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1980), remains the 
definitive case on the proper choice of law analysis for product 
liability insurance controversies, see Diamond Shamrock 
Chemicals, 609 A.2d at 465, a different analysis now governs 
environmental insurance controversies.  In Gilbert Spruance, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court applied the site-specific rule 
enunciated in Johnson Matthey Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers 
Ass'n Insurance Co., 593 A.2d 367 (N.J. App. Div. 1991), for 
cases involving policies that did not contemplate a New Jersey 
risk and waste that, while predictably "coming to rest" in New 
Jersey, was generated out of state.  See Gilbert Spruance Co., 
629 A.2d at 892. 
 Gilbert Spruance involved the interpretation of a 
pollution exclusion clause contained in a comprehensive general 
liability policy issued by a Pennsylvania carrier to a defendant 
incorporated in Pennsylvania.  The insurance contracts were 
negotiated and countersigned in Pennsylvania, and the premiums 
were paid there.  Although the waste was generated by the 
defendant in Philadelphia, the location of the company's paint 
manufacturing business, the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
convinced that the parties could "reasonably foresee that a New 
Jersey waste site would receive the insured's waste products," 
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thus rendering the application of New Jersey law equitable.  See 
629 A.2d at 886.  The state's "compelling interest" in assuring 
the financing of a clean up of the New Jersey waste site played a 
very substantial role in the court's conclusion that New Jersey 
had the "dominant significant relationship" necessary to overcome 
the substantial contacts with Pennsylvania.  See id. at 894.  
 Gilbert Spruance thus altered the balance of 
Restatement § 6 factors in environmental coverage cases.  See 629 
A.2d at 894. While it rejected a categorical approach selecting 
the state of either generation or disposal in favor of a "more 
extended analysis pursuant to § 6(2)," the Gilbert Spruance court 
explained that "when applying the principles enunciated in 
Restatement section 6 to a case in which out-of state generated 
waste foreseeably comes to rest in New Jersey, New Jersey has the 
dominant significant relationship."  See 629 A.2d at 894; see 
also National Starch & Chem. v. Great American Ins. Cos., 743 F. 
Supp. 318 (D.N.J. 1990) (earlier case finding that the location 
of the waste sites is of "paramount concern", although not 
irrebuttable).  Gilbert Spruance thus establishes that, in 
environmental cases, the location of the site carries very 
substantial weight in the "significant relationship" analysis, 
typically adequate to overcome the contacts of the place of 
contracting.0 
                                                           
0One might argue that Gilbert Spruance establishes the rule that 
the law of the state where toxic waste comes to rest will apply, 
if it was reasonably foreseeable that the waste would end up 
there, obviating the need for the § 6 analysis.  At most, the 
court left the question open.  See 629 A.2d at 894 ("[W]e express 
no view on the proposition stated in J. Josephson, Inc, [626 A.3d 
18 
 NL contends that Gilbert Spruance reduces the 
importance of the place of contracting in all New Jersey choice 
of law analyses, even outside of environmental claims.  Although 
the appellate division  had left open the possibility that the 
site-specific approach it adopted could apply outside the 
environmental coverage context it was considering, Johnson 
Matthey, 593 A.2d at 373, the policies driving the adoption of 
the site-specific rule are inapposite in product liability 
coverage actions.  In particular, the adoption of the site-
specific approach rested heavily on the compelling (for § 6 
purposes) interest that a waste-site state has in "determining 
the availability of funds for the cleanup of hazardous substances 
located within its boundaries."  Leksi Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 
736 F.Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.N.J. 1990).  But the state's interest 
in determining coverage for product liability actions is more 
amorphous and therefore less compelling than its interests in 
environmental cleanup.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
81 (N.J. Law Div. 1993),] that when another state is the 
foreseeable location of the waste-site, the court must engage in 
a section 6 analysis to determine if that state has the most 
significant relationship with the parties, the transaction, and 
the outcome of the controversy . . . .").  In passing on the case 
before it, however, the Gilbert Spruance court incorporated the 
interests of the waste site state into the customary § 6 
analysis.  Id. at 894. The court also endorsed the approach of 
allowing resolution of issues "by the courts of the states whose 
interests are immediately affected during the course of 
litigation which can be effectively managed.".  See Gilbert 
Spruance, 629 A.2d at 895 (emphasis added). We believe that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's inclusion of the manageability caveat 
further signals its intent to preserve a balancing analysis 
rather than to discard it in favor of an inflexible rule.   
19 
 There is also less predictability concerning the situs 
of product liability claims, and a manageability problem in light 
of the potentially far larger number of product liability claims 
(relative to environmental sites in any given insurance coverage 
action.)  Thus, because the benefits of the site-specific 
approach are reduced while the problems associated with its 
implementation are magnified outside the environmental coverage 
context, we believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not 
extend the site-specific approach to the product liability 
coverage area.0 
 There is precedent for our differential treatment of 
the choice of law question in the product liability coverage 
situation relative to the environmental coverage situation.  In 
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
609 A.2d at 465, which preceded but foreshadowed Gilbert 
Spruance, the Appellate Division addressed a case involving both 
Agent Orange product liability claims and environmental claims 
stemming from the defendant's manufacture of dioxin.  For the 
Agent Orange toxic tort claims, the court relied on the fact that 
                                                           
0In applying the new standard to environmental choice of law 
questions, the New Jersey courts will have to conduct separate 
choice of law analyses for environmental coverage claims and for 
mass tort coverage claims even when they arise in a single case. 
There is nothing anomalous about this result, since § 145 of the 
Restatement Conflicts of Laws explains that, even within a single 
action, the choice of law analysis applies to particular issues, 
not to the case monolithically.  Moreover, in repudiating the 
uniform contract approach, see Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d at 892, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to 
countenance the application of different state laws even to a 
single issue of coverage.  This may of course be quite difficult 
and time-consuming, and result in serious management problems for 
the courts applying this rule.   
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the New York was the place of contracting to apply New York law 
to all of the Agent Orange coverage actions irrespective of where 
the claims arose.   
 Diamond Shamrock, incorporated and located in Ohio, had 
used a New York broker to purchase the policies.  The court found 
that the facts that Agent Orange was manufactured in Newark, New 
Jersey, that it was sold to the government in New Jersey, that 
some of the claimants were New Jersey veterans, that some of the 
underlying suits were filed in New Jersey, and that the coverage 
action was pending in New Jersey did not establish the dominant 
relationship necessary to override the preference for New York as 
the place of contracting.    
 However, in determining which law to apply in the 
dioxin environmental coverage actions, the Diamond Shamrock court 
correctly anticipated the New Jersey Supreme Court by using the 
site-specific analysis enunciated by the Appellate Division's 
opinion in Gilbert Spruance.  The court determined that the law 
of New Jersey, the state where toxic wastes predictably came to 
rest (dioxin was manufactured in Newark), should apply to the 
environmental coverage claims involving New Jersey sites.  See 
609 A.2d at 455.  While this case predated Gilbert Spruance, it 
presaged the principles announced in that decision, and therefore 
effectively demonstrates how a court confronting environmental 
coverage claims and other coverage claims in the same suit must 
perform distinct choice of law analyses for each.  
 In summary, fundamental choice of law principles 
require that courts consider different issues separately; a 
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single analysis does not typically resolve the choice of law 
question for all claims in a suit.  After Gilbert Spruance, New 
Jersey's choice of law rules require not only that environmental 
coverage claims be considered separately from other claims (such 
as for product liability), but also that they be considered in 
the site-specific framework, which is distinct from the 
customary, modified contacts analysis still applicable in other 
coverage contexts. 
 
 C. The District Court's Approach 
 After re-examining the choice of law issue, the 
district court essentially adopted its July 11, 1991 choice of 
law decision in disposing of these four new lead paint coverage 
claims.  The 1991 decision purported to analyze the question for 
both the environmental coverage action and the lead paint 
coverage action, (as the combined caption and conflated discus-
sion of the two actions suggest).  The district court apparently 
believed that a single choice had to be made for both.  Although 
it acknowledged that the lead paint cases were the subject of an 
action separate from the environmental coverage action, it 
stated:  
[P]laintiff seeks a declaratory judgment of defendant's 
liability for those three particular [lead paint] 
claims in the "environmental action" as well.  Thus, 
the court must apply the same substantive law in both 
the "lead paint" and "environmental" actions, or else 
the parties rights and obligations under the policy as 
it applies to the "lead paint" claims would be 
interpreted according to two states' substantive laws. 
 
7/11/91 Op. at 8 n.3.   
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 The court also relied on the uniform contract approach 
articulated in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., 559 A.2d 435 (N.J. App. Div. 1989), to support its 
choice of New Jersey law for all the environmental and product 
liability claims notwithstanding the fact that only some of the 
waste sites and none of the lead paint actions were located in 
New Jersey. (7/11/91 Op. at 10).  In reaffirming its 1991 choice 
of law decision, the district court applied the law of the case 
doctrine and rejected CU's argument that an intervening change in 
the law wrought by Gilbert Spruance required a different 
resolution.  The court also cited its concerns about the manage-
ability of the site-specific choice of law approach in refusing 
to apply Gilbert Spruance.0 
 In its initial (1991) decision, the district court 
acknowledged the presumption in contract actions in favor of the 
law of the place of contracting (here, New York). (7/11/91 Op. at 
5).  Nevertheless, the court relied on the "strong public 
interest in insuring that environmental contamination within the 
state will be remedied," id. at 8, to find the "significant 
relationship" necessary to select New Jersey law instead.  
Indeed, the court conceded that the other considerations in the 
contractual "significant relationship" inquiry, such as the 
                                                           
0Although the district court was aware of the site-specific test 
announced by Gilbert Spruance after its original choice of law 
decision in 1991, it declined to apply the test because its 
application in the environmental case would result in the choice 
of 34 different state laws, a result it regarded as so 
unmanageable that the New Jersey Supreme Court could not have 
intended it.  
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reasonable expectations of the parties and the need for certainty 
and legal uniformity, actually favored the choice of New York law 
as the place of contract and would have resulted in that choice 
were it not for the significant relationship supposedly 
established by the presence of some New Jersey waste sites.  See 
7/11/91 Op. at 10. 
 In sum, the choice of law analysis for the lead paint 
claim coverage dispute is separate and distinct under New Jersey 
law from that for the environmental claims, and yet the district 
court appears to have combined the claims for this purpose in 
both the original 1991 opinion and its May 26, 1994 opinion.  See 
7/11/91 Op. at 7-8 and 5/26/94 Op. at 10.0  This was error. 
                                                           
0While the court seemed to accept the magistrate's conclusion 
that the law of the case doctrine obviated any need for the court 
to reconsider the original choice of law decision for the four 
new lead paint actions, see 4/26/94 Op. at 6, it conceded that 
Gilbert Spruance's rejection of the uniform contract approach 
"might require the court to re-examine its choice of law deci-
sion." Id. at 9.  The court did re-examine its 1991 decision, see 
Id. at 9, but abided by it both because of manageability concerns 
and because of the court's conviction that New Jersey, where a 
number of the environmental claims arose, had the "dominant 
significant relationship" to the transaction.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that Gilbert Spruance pertained solely to environmental 
coverage actions, we agree that it precluded application of the 
law of the case doctrine here.  Although federal courts always 
retain the discretion to reconsider issues already decided in the 
same proceeding, see Deisler v. McCormack Aggregates Co., 54 F.3d 
1074, 1086 n.20 (3d Cir. 1995); Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Jurisdiction, §4478 at 789-90, courts will reconsider an issue 
when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, 
when new evidence has become available, or when there is a need 
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.  Wright, 
Miller & Kane, § 4478 at 790.  We believe reconsideration was 
warranted here for two reasons.  First, the district court's 
failure to perform a separate choice of law analysis for the 
environmental coverage action and for the lead paint coverage 
action constituted a clear error. Second, to the extent that the 
24 
III.  Discussion 
 CU argues that the district court compounded this error 
by considering the (social) policies implicated by the underlying 
actions, rather than limiting its focus to the policies of 
insurance law.  We must address this contention before proceeding 
to the appropriate choice of law framework applicable to the lead 
paint coverage actions.   
 In coverage cases, New Jersey courts have elected to 
analyze not only the policies involved in interpreting insurance 
law but also those policies underlying their environmental and 
tort laws.  See Diamond Shamrock Chemicals, 609 A.2d at 455 
("Since New Jersey has a paramount interest in the remediation of 
such waste sites, and in the fair compensation of its victims, 
this State's urgent concern for the health and safety of its 
citizens 'extends to assuring that casualty insurance companies 
fairly recognize the legal liabilities of their insureds.'") 
(citing Johnson Matthey Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. 
Co., 593 A.2d 367, 370 (App. Div. 1991)).  Therefore, a court 
would not err by considering the interests implicated by the 
underlying litigation in deciding the choice of law issue in an 
insurance coverage action (to the extent that the underlying 
litigation affects the interests of one of the states whose law 
arguably applies).  These underlying policy interests are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
court conflated the environmental coverage action with this lead 
paint coverage action, the change announced by Gilbert Spruance -
- creating a unique analysis for environmental coverage cases -- 
constituted an intervening change in the controlling law. 
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especially important in environmental coverage cases. See supra 
at 18. 
 But the analysis of the various states' policies and 
interests implicated in the environmental coverage litigation 
does not track the analysis of the interests implicated by the 
tort cases underlying this coverage dispute.  Cf. Diamond 
Shamrock, 609 A.2d at 455, 465 (applying New Jersey law to dioxin 
environmental suits and New York law to Agent Orange claims).  
Unlike some of the underlying environmental claims which must be 
decided under New Jersey law, Pennsylvania or Louisiana law 
governed the four new (underlying) lead paint actions.  See 
Appellant's Br. at 17.  Thus, although New Jersey may have an 
interest in applying its laws to coverage disputes involving 
actions whose underlying merits were adjudicated under New Jersey 
law (in order to assure that the state's tort policies are not 
frustrated by a lack of insurance coverage), that interest is 
simply inapposite to these new lead paint actions arising in 
Pennsylvania and Louisiana.  There is no indication, moreover, 
that the district court applied New Jersey law to the coverage 
dispute in an effort to protect New Jersey's tort (as opposed to 
environmental) policies. 
 While CU's contention that the court should not have 
considered the policies implicated in the underlying litigation 
has no merit, the district court did, as we have stated, err by 
considering policies implicated in the related but separate 
environmental actions rather than those involved in the lead 
paint actions.  See 5/26/94 Op. at 10 (reaffirming July 1991 
26 
decision and explaining, "[t]hat decision was based in part on 
the number of environmental claims in the companion action 
arising in New Jersey, and admittedly on the need for uniformity 
in the interpretation of the insurance contracts at issue in both 
suits.").  Even before Westinghouse was overruled by Gilbert 
Spruance, the uniform contract approach should have been applied 
separately to aggregate the environmental claims, which turned on 
the interpretation of one clause in the insurance contract, and 
to the product liability claims, which involved a different 
clause of the policy and deserved, under the principles of 
Restatement § 145, a separate choice of law analysis.   
 The court found that New Jersey had "the dominant 
relationship to the parties and the underlying insurance transac-
tion" even though New Jersey's only connection to the case is its 
incorporation of the defendant.  To so find in spite of the facts 
that the harms occurred in Pennsylvania and Louisiana and that 
the insurance contracts were negotiated and executed in New York 
-- so that the parties must have reasonably expected, as even the 
district court recognized, New York law to apply -- manifests the 
court's conflation of the relevant interests in this case with 
those relevant in the environmental action.  As we have 
discussed, even if the environmental coverage claims and the lead 
paint coverage claims were brought in a single action, § 145 
required the court to conduct a separate choice of law analysis 
for each of the two types of claims.   
 The choice of law for this non-environmental insurance 
coverage action is still governed by State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
27 
Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1980), and thus, 
unless a "dominant and significant relationship" mandates the 
application of another state's law, the law of the place of 
contract will apply. Given that the contract was negotiated, 
executed and performed in New York, the district court correctly 
concluded that New York was the place of contracting.  We now 
examine the contacts and interests relevant under Restatement §§ 
6 and 188 to determine whether New Jersey had a "dominant and 
significant relationship" to the lead paint coverage action.  See 
Gilbert Spruance, 629 A.2d at 888; Simmons, 417 A.2d at 491-92.0 
 Section 188 lists as the contacts to be considered in 
applying the interests analysis:  (1) the place of contracting, 
(2) the place of negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of 
performance, (4) the location of the subject matter of the 
contract, and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation, and place of business of the parties.  Restatement 
Conflicts (Second) § 188(2).  These contacts overwhelmingly favor 
New York in this case.  As we stated earlier, NL retained a New 
York insurance broker to negotiate the policies; the policies 
were signed in New York by representatives from each parties' New 
York office; CU coded the NL policies and premiums as New York 
policies and premium taxes on these policies were paid in New 
York; NL's headquarters as well as its principal business 
operations were located in New York; and CU executed this 
                                                           
0None of the parties argued that either Pennsylvania's or 
Louisiana's law should apply to this action. 
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transaction out of its New York office.  Only NL's place of 
incorporation favored New Jersey law.   
 Even though the subject-matter-of-the-contract factor 
(liability for property damage and bodily injury) does not 
necessarily favor New York law, it certainly does not favor New 
Jersey law.  Because these contacts so clearly favor the applica-
tion of New York law, it should apply unless the interests 
described by § 6 of the Restatement, see supra at 11-12, 
establish a dominant and significant relationship with New 
Jersey.  We take these factors up seriatim. 
 1. The Needs of the Interstate System 
 The Restatement explains that this factor is intended 
to "further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate 
commercial intercourse."  Restatement Conflicts § 6 cmt. d.  The 
consistency and predictability which emanate from a clear rule 
foster commerce and harmonious interstate relations by reducing 
the uncertainty associated with entering into commercial transac-
tions. Relative to the multifactored interest analysis, the lex 
loci contractus rule typically better protects both the parties' 
reasonable expectations and the consistency and predictability of 
contractual adjudications.  See Simmons, 417 A.2d at 496.  As the 
§ 188 analysis demonstrates, this factor clearly favors New York 
law.  Moreover, the district court acknowledged that the parties 
must have reasonably expected New York law to apply.  Thus, both 
generally and under the specific facts of this case, the needs of 
the interstate system would be best served by the choice of New 
York law. 
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 2.  Relevant Policies of Other Interested States  
 State statutes which require or prohibit particular 
clauses in insurance agreements evidence a state's policy in the 
insurance area.  See Belle v. Merchants & Businessmen's Mutual 
Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 878, 881-82 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 585 
A.2d 395 (N.J. 1990).  But states' interests in insurance policy 
interpretation are not limited to those explicitly articulated in 
these sorts of statutes.  As we have explained, New Jersey courts 
seek to avoid the frustration of the interests and policies 
expressed in their substantive laws that could occur through 
narrow interpretations of the coverage available under the 
applicable insurance contracts. See Diamond Shamrock Chem. v. 
Aetna, 609 A.2d 440 (N.J. App. Div. 1992) ("Since New Jersey has 
a paramount interest in the remediation of such waste sites, and 
in the fair compensation of its victims, this State's urgent 
concern for the health and safety of its citizens 'extends to 
assuring that casualty insurance companies fairly recognize the 
legal liabilities of their insureds.'") (citing Johnson Matthey 
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 367, 370 
(N.J. App. Div. 1991)).  Thus, a state's interest in determining 
the scope of liability in the underlying lead paint claims does 
bear on the scope of coverage.   
 The lead paint claims whose coverage is at issue here 
will be decided under Pennsylvania and Louisiana law.  New York 
pursues a policy of deterring the sort of conspiratorial activity 
alleged to have occurred in New York by assuring that the 
penalties imposed through tort awards actually impact on the 
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alleged perpetrators rather than on their insurance carriers.  
See Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 533 
N.Y.S.2d 91, 102 (App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989) 
(noting New York's policy of "assur[ing] that corporate polluters 
bear the full burden of their own actions spoiling the environ-
ment" by giving pollution exclusion clauses broad effect).  See 
also National Starch & Chem. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 743 F.Supp. 
318, 319 n. 1 (D.N.J. 1990) (observing that relative to New 
Jersey law, New York law was less favorable to insureds in 
disputes involving the pollution exclusion clauses of insurance 
contracts).  Although the parties did not brief the nature of 
Louisiana's or Pennsylvania's tort policies, i.e., whether they 
favor compensation and deterrence over fostering a hospitable 
business environment, it is clear that New Jersey has no interest 
in interpreting the insurance contracts that could vindicate 
those other states' policies.  In any event, it seems unlikely 
that Pennsylvania's or Louisiana's interest standing alone could 
overcome the very substantial contacts and interests of New York. 
 3. Relevant Policies of the Forum 
 For a state's policies to be relevant in a choice of 
law analysis, the law embodying the policy must relate to a 
contact. See Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189-90 (N.J. 
1986) ("If a state's contacts are not related to the policies 
underlying its law, then that state does not possess an interest 
in having its law apply.").  The district court relied on the 
number of environmental claims arising in New Jersey for its 
conclusion that New Jersey had the dominant and significant 
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relationship necessary for the application of New Jersey law in 
this case.  5/26/94 Op. at 10. Two errors render this analysis 
flawed.  First, this lead paint coverage case did not properly 
implicate any of New Jersey's environmental policies.  Second, 
even if New Jersey's environmental policies were at all pertinent 
in these lead paint cases, they bear no relation to New Jersey's 
contacts.  New Jersey's only connection to this litigation is 
that NL was incorporated and had some operations there.   
 While these contacts might justify consideration of New 
Jersey's policies in corporate governance or tax cases, they do 
not justify considering New Jersey's tort policies or the related 
insurance coverage policies.  The district court did recognize 
New Jersey's interest to "see[] that harms caused by its 
corporations are properly redressed."  See 5/26/94 Op. at 11.  
Cf. Restatement Conflicts of Laws (Second) § 145 cmt. c ("If the 
primary purpose of the tort rule involved is to deter or punish 
misconduct, . . . the state where the conduct took place may be 
the state of dominant interest . . . .").  However, given that 
the activities complained of here (the alleged conspiracy of NL 
and the Lead Industries Association to conceal the dangers of 
lead paint) primarily occurred in New York, New Jersey's 
disciplinary interests are attenuated.  Moreover, expressions of 
New Jersey's policies seem to reflect a greater emphasis on 
compensation, which would favor the law of the state where the 
injury occurred, than on deterrence, which would favor the law of 
the state where the conduct occurred. See Diamond Shamrock, 609 
A.2d at 455 (emphasizing New Jersey's "paramount interest" in 
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remediation and compensation); Leksi, 736 F.Supp. at 1334-36; 
National Starch, 743 F.Supp. at 326.  Thus, we find that New 
Jersey's interests were either inapposite or quite small compared 
to New York's. 
 4.  Protection of Justified Expectations 
 Like the first factor, this factor seeks to promote 
commercial transactions.  By enforcing the parties' expectations, 
courts interpreting contracts assure the consistency and predict-
ability necessary to a healthy business environment.  Indeed, for 
these very reasons, traditional contract principles direct that 
the parties' objectively reasonable expectations govern the 
choice of law decision.  See National Starch and Chem. Co. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Cos., 743 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D.N.J. 1990) ("[T]he 
reasonable expectations of the parties are controlling[, and] 
State Farm [v. Simmons] must be applied with a view toward 
fulfillment of the parties' objectively reasonable 
expectations.").0  We agree with the district court that the 
parties' objectively reasonable expectations were that New York 
law would govern the interpretation of these contracts.  See 
7/11/91 Op. at 10 ("Because all parties to the contract knew at 
the time of the signing the general rule that the law of the 
                                                           
0Although the National Starch court, failing to anticipate 
Gilbert Spruance, applied the uniform contract approach to choose 
the law of the place of contract over the laws of the states 
where sites were located, its statement of the principle quoted 
in the main text remains valid.  The National Starch court cited 
general contract cases from New Jersey to support the proposition 
that reasonable expectations should govern contract issues, 
including the choice of applicable law.  See Meier v. New Jersey 
Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862, 869-70 (N.J. 1986) (using reasonable 
expectations to determine scope and terms of policy surrender). 
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state in which the contract was formed governed the contract, it 
is reasonable to assume that the parties reasonably expected New 
York law to apply.") 
 Nevertheless, the district court did not accord this 
consideration much weight in its analysis, principally because it 
was under the erroneous impression that New Jersey's strong 
interest in remediating environmental contamination within the 
state gave New Jersey, where many of the waste sites were 
located, a dominant interest in applying its laws to any and all 
coverage disputes.0  As we have explained, however, Gilbert 
Spruance only increased the importance of the interest of the 
waste-site state in environmental coverage disputes, not in 
product liability suits. Consequently, the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the parties should have been accorded the 
considerable weight that they ordinarily receive, which favors 
New York law in this case. 
 5. The Basic Policies Underlying the Relevant 
  Fields of Law (Insurance and Tort Law) 
 
 The differing degrees of interest which competing 
states have in vindicating various insurance and tort law 
policies also affect the choice of law.  Insurance law policy 
deals primarily with the proper standards and procedures for the 
                                                           
0The 7/11/91 district court opinion predated Gilbert Spruance and 
thus did not rely on it.  The district court's May 26, 1994 
opinion disposing of the four new lead paint claims, see supra p. 
8, does cite Gilbert Spruance in order to affirm its emphasis on 
the location of the waste sites in the companion environmental 
action, which was the basis for its decision to apply New Jersey 
law to the lead paint claims.  As we have explained, this was 
incorrect.    
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fair interpretation of the insurance contract, accounting for the 
interests of the insurer, the insured, and the public.  Given the 
overwhelming contacts of the insurance transaction to New York, 
we are hard pressed to find an interest New Jersey (or any other 
state) can assert in using its law to determine the balance of 
relevant insurance policies. 
 Tort law policies, on the other hand, influence the 
standards and procedures used to determine liability, fix 
compensation, and deter tortious conduct.  The sole interest New 
Jersey could have in applying its tort law under the facts of the 
lead paint cases (where the injury occurred elsewhere) would be 
to discipline a company incorporated under its laws.  As we have 
noted, however, New Jersey seems to be more concerned with 
assuring adequate funds for compensation and remediation than it 
does with imposing penalties.  See supra at 31-32.  Because NL's 
principal place of business and, perhaps more importantly, the 
locus of the alleged tortious conduct were not in New Jersey, see 
supra at 4-5, New Jersey's interest in disciplining the company 
is weak.  It is New York, as the locus of the alleged 
conspiratorial acts and as NL's principal place of business, 
which has the interest in fashioning the penalty imposed by the 
tort system.   
 To the extent that the harms occurred and the injured 
parties resided in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, those states may 
have an interest in assuring that the tortfeasor redresses the 
property damage and personal injury.  The relative strength of 
such an interest depends on the balance of policies -- such as 
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compensating victims or deterring culpable conduct, see 
Restatement Conflicts (Second) § 145 cmt. c -- struck by the 
relevant tort laws.  In any case, both Pennsylvania and Louisiana 
have some interest in seeing that the harms occurring within 
their borders are redressed.  But New Jersey does not have a 
cognizable interest in applying its tort laws to these lead paint 
coverage disputes. 
 6.  Certainty, Predictability, and Uniformity of Result 
 This factor closely tracks the concerns embodied in the 
first (needs of the interstate system) and fourth (justified 
expectations of the parties) factors in its concern about the 
effects of more flexible, and thus less predictable, legal rules 
on commercial activity.  As we have explained, New York as the 
place of contracting and as the locus of the allegedly unlawful 
activity would presumably apply its law to this case.  The 
district court correctly recognized that these parties must have 
reasonably expected New York law to apply, and it is likely that 
repeat players in this market, whose business the resolution of 
this case will affect, would also expect New York law to apply 
under these circumstances.  While some might have entertained the 
possibility that the insurance coverage action might be governed 
by the law of the states where the harms ultimately occurred 
(here, Pennsylvania and Louisiana), it is unlikely that anyone 
expected that the law of a state whose connections and interests 
are as tangential as New Jersey's are in this case would apply.  
Indeed, to establish a standard where such comparatively minor 
interests could govern would throw settled expectations into 
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disarray; parties would have no way of predicting which law would 
apply to their contracts.  We therefore conclude that this factor 
strongly favors the choice of New York law. 
 
 7.  Ease of Determination and Application 
 The Restatement explains that choice-of-law rules 
"should be simple and easy to apply."  See Restatement Conflicts 
(Second) § 6, cmt. j.  Presuming that the law of the place of 
contracting applies to non-environmental insurance coverage 
disputes provides a simple and clear cut rule for courts to apply 
ex post.  Such a rule also provides a stable and predictable 
environment for contracting parties ex ante.  This factor, 
therefore, also favors New York law, although the Restatement 
does not weigh this consideration too heavily.  Id.  
 8.  Summary 
 After performing this separate choice-of-law analysis 
for the lead paint coverage disputes, we conclude that the 
interests implicated in this lead paint coverage action do not 
relate to the contacts NL had with New Jersey.  At best, New 
Jersey had an "interest in seeing that harms caused by its 
corporations are properly redressed."  5/26/94 Op. at 11.  But 
given that NL's principal place of business was in New York and 
that New Jersey's laws do not apply to the underlying products 
liability actions, this interest is especially attenuated here.  
In contrast, the connections of NL and of the insurance 
transaction to New York are both significant and pertinent, 
giving rise to the substantial interest New York has in seeing 
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its law apply:  the insurance contract was negotiated and 
performed in New York; the policies were coded as New York 
policies; New York taxes were paid on the policies; both parties 
maintained their principal places of business there; and the 
conspiratorial acts underlying these lead paint claims are 
alleged to have occurred there.  Under Simmons, therefore, New 
York law should apply. 
IV. Conclusion 
 We will therefore reverse the judgment of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings in which the court 
should apply New York law to the four new lead paint actions.  
Because the issues of CU's duty to defend and its rights to 
contribution and allocation were improperly decided under New 
Jersey law, the district court should make the New York law 
determination in the first instance on remand.  We do not reach 
the other claims.0 
                                                           
0Although CU's duty to indemnify NL for these lead paint claims 
was separately adjudicated in the environmental action, which is 
not before us, we believe that the foregoing analysis of Gilbert 
Spruance may be pertinent to the indemnity issue as well. 
